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America Invents Act’s Prior User Defense: Lessons from 
Global Patent Regimes and Legislative History 
Aleksey Khamin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The America Invents Act (“AIA”)1 drastically changed both the U.S. patent 
system and the landscape of the U.S. intellectual property regime. Several 
provisions of the Act are likely to make trade secret protection more attractive.2 
One such provision, the “prior user defense,”3 which exists in some form in most 
patent systems around the world, protects a secret prior use of an invention from 
the infringement claims of a later patentee.4 The AIA implementation of this 
defense, codified as 35 U.S.C. § 273 (effective September 16, 2011), created 
numerous uncertainties about the provision’s elements and scope.5 The 2011 
adoption of the AIA prior user rights provision was shaped by two decades of 
academic discourse6 and several years of heated political debates.7 Unlike the 
                                                          
* Aleksey “Alex” Khamin is a patent attorney admitted to the practice of law in New York and 
New Jersey. He would like to thank his family and friends for their unwavering support. The author 
would like to express gratitude to the faculty and staff of Rutgers School of Law for their academic 
support, with special thanks to Professors Jonathan Bick, John Kettle, and Sabrina Safrin for insightful 
comments and thought-provoking conversations.  
1 Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of Title 35 of the U.S. 
Code). 
2 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1113 (2012). 
3 “First user right,” “prior user right” and “prior user defense” are used interchangeably in patent 
law and in this article. The AIA provides for a full legal defense of a prior user of an invention against 
an infringement claim by a later patentee of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012). 
4 E.g., “This new defense will ensure that the first inventor of a new process, or of a product used 
in a manufacturing process, can continue to use the invention in a commercial process even if a 
subsequent inventor later patents the idea.” 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement 
of Sen. Kyl). 
5 THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/pur-2011nov08-jipa.pdf (letter from Kenji Koumoto, President of Japan Intellectual 
Property Association, to David J. Kappos, Director of the USPTO, including a sample list of issues to be 
clarified). 
6 See, e.g., Gary L. Griswold & F. Andrew Ubel, Prior User Rights—A Necessary Part of A First-
to-File System, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 567, 592 (1993); Keith M. Kupferschmid, Prior User Rights: 
The Inventor’s Lottery Ticket, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 213 (1993); F. Andrew Ubel, Who’s on First?—The 
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debates of the 1990s on the proper contours of the defense, the post-AIA discussion 
shifted to the interpretation and impact of the new provision.8 This Article provides 
a detailed analysis of this novel AIA provision in the context of legislative history 
and global experience, and argues for the clarification and expansive interpretation 
of several ambiguous terms. 
Part I of this Article highlights the complex relationship between patent and 
trade secret protection and discusses how the prior user defense may contribute to a 
shift of that delicate balance. Part II provides the international context for prior user 
rights and analyzes the contrasting experiences of Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Part III summarizes the limited history of prior user rights in the United States and 
delves into the complex legislative history of the provision. Part IV analyzes key 
interpretive problems in the text of the provision and suggests solutions. Part V 
suggests the possible impact of the new defense on several innovation-generating 
communities, including corporations, universities, and individual inventors. The 
Article concludes that while the current AIA prior user defense provision creates 
potential advantages for corporations and universities, it may be detrimental to the 
individual inventor. To remedy this problem, this Article advocates an expansive 
interpretation of key terms of the provision, such as “commercial use in the U.S.” 
I. INVENTOR’S TRILEMMA: PATENTS, TRADE SECRETS, OR THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN 
Every inventor must decide what legal strategies he or she will use to protect 
his or her inventions. Usually, there are three mutually exclusive options:9 patent, 
                                                                                                                                      
Trade Secret Prior User or A Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 413 
(1994); Paul R. Morico, Are Prior User Rights Consistent with Federal Patent Policy?: The U.S. 
Considers Legislation to Adopt Prior User Rights, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 572, 580 
(1996); Leslie M. Hill, Prior User Defense: The Road to Hell Is Paved with Good and Bad Intentions, 
10 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 513, 548 (2001). 
7 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Patent Reform: Expanding Prior User Rights Is a Bad Idea, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:23 PM), http:// http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/28/patent-reform-
expanded-prior-users-rights-is-a-bad-idea/id=16026; Gene Quinn, Sensenbrenner to Kappos: Prior User 
Rights Is Poison Pill, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 30, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/03/ 
30/sensenbrenner-to-kappos-prior-user-rights-is-poison-pill/id=16082. 
8 Jacob Neu, Patent Prior User Rights: What’s the Fuss?, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 1, 2 (2013) 
(suggesting that the current version of prior user defense is not a significant incentive to keep an 
invention secret). 
9 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41391, THE ROLE OF TRADE SECRETS IN 
INNOVATION POLICY 9 (2014). 
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trade secret, and public domain.10 Patent is considered to be the strongest protection 
because it grants the right to exclude, specifically, the right to prosecute 
infringers.11 However, patent protection has significant drawbacks: it is expensive 
to obtain and maintain,12 it must be acquired in each country of operation,13 its term 
is limited to 20 years,14 and not every invention is patentable.15 Furthermore, in an 
infringement suit, a defendant is likely to challenge the scope and validity of a 
patent; a successful challenge may limit or even invalidate the patent, and the 
average rate of such invalidation is high.16 On the other hand, trade secret 
protection has significant advantages; it can cover virtually any subject matter and 
is not limited by the duration of its term and geography.17 Trade secret litigation is 
less expensive than patent litigation.18 However, if another party rediscovers or 
reverse engineers the trade secret through legitimate means, the trade secret loses 
most of its value for purposes of intellectual property (“IP”) protection.19 Patents 
                                                          
10 Placing an invention in the public domain, paradoxically, is a form of strategic invention 
protection because it prevents others from obtaining patents on the invention and from claiming it as a 
trade secret. 
11 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (right to exclude); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (elements of infringement); 
See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret 
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 387 (2002). 
12 Bronwyn Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A 
Literature Review, 26 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, No. 17983, 2012. 
13 MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 54–55 (3d ed. 2003). 
14 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012). 
15 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (limiting patentable subject matter); see also Beckerman-Rodau, supra 
note 11, at 383–86. 
16 Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 27 (2008) (suggesting that the 
majority of litigated patents are invalid). 
17 “Trade secret law reaches into a number of corners patent law cannot. The definition of trade 
secret (valuable information) is broader than the definition of patentable subject matter, for example, 
protecting business plans, customer lists, and so-called ‘negative know-how’ against use by others.” 
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 
331 (2008). 
18 See, e.g., 3 ROGER MILGRIM & ERIC BENSEN, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 18.42 (2014) (“patent 
litigation is the most expensive form of litigation, surpassing even so notoriously complex and 
expensive a form as antitrust litigation.”). 
19 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 371 (2003) (“Not only does patent law solve problems of trade secret law, but trade 
secret law plugs gaps and softens rigidities in patent law.”); see also Kewanee Oil v. Bicorn Corp., 416 
U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (holding that federal patent system and state trade secret law are complementary to 
each other). 
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and trade secrets are often viewed as two complementary systems for protecting 
inventions.20 
Before the adoption of the AIA, these three options (patent, trade secret, and 
public domain) were, for the most part, mutually exclusive in the United States. 
Innovations disclosed in patent applications or released to the public domain were 
not eligible for trade secret protection. Innovators who commercially exploited 
their inventions for over one year, without disclosing them in a patent application, 
normally could not obtain a patent.21 Furthermore, such innovators faced the risk 
that another inventor could obtain a patent on the invention they had been using 
and subsequently institute an infringement action, enjoining the prior secret user 
from practicing the invention.22 
However, the adoption of the AIA is likely to make trade secret protection a 
more attractive option than before. As the sponsors of the AIA intended, the prior 
user defense is designed not only to provide for fairness to a prior inventor, but also 
to boost the rights of a trade secret holder against the rights of a later patentee,23 at 
least in capital intensive industries.24 
The exact magnitude of the likely shift towards trade secret protection 
depends on a host of invention-specific factors, including the adoption of other 
relevant legislative acts,25 the industry type,26 the lifetime of the product or 
                                                          
20 Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 19 (2008) (“Patents and trade secrets are not mutually exclusive but are highly 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. . . . In fact, trade secrets are the first line of defense: they 
precede patents, accompany patents, and follow patents.”). 
21 See 35 U.S.C § 102(b) (2000). 
22 One commentator suggests, “[in the United States] a later patentee has never enjoined a trade 
secret owner.” Jorda, supra note 20, at 27. However, there is no guarantee that this cannot happen, 
especially after the change to first-to-file system. The commentator does not rely on this observation to 
protect the first inventor in the future. Accordingly, he argues for expansion of the prior user rights in 
the United States to match prior user rights abroad. 
23 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
24 See 157 CONG. REC. E1219 (daily ed. June 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
25 THOMAS, supra note 9, at 14–15 (reviewing several possible legislative developments that may 
boost trade secret protection). 
26 In those industries where trade secrets are generally difficult to keep, patents are difficult to 
obtain and those granted difficult to enforce. In those industries where trade secrets are easier to keep 
and patents therefore difficult to police, patents covering such art are easier to obtain and enforce. In this 
way the federal patient laws can be seen to be promoting the disclosure and dissemination of those 
inventions that might otherwise remain trade secrets, and by encouraging the patenting and therefore the 
disclosure of such inventions the patent system advances the art. See Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-
Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 715 
(1996). 
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technology to be protected, and the ease of reverse engineering.27 Yet the prior user 
defense has made the trade secret strategy more attractive, at least for internal 
industrial processes that cannot be easily discovered by an examination of the end 
product. Not surprisingly, large pharmaceutical companies praised the introduction 
of the defense,28 in accordance with the results of industrial surveys that 
consistently show that large corporations prefer to use trade secret as a way of 
protecting their IP assets.29 
II. PRIOR USER RIGHTS: INSIGHTS FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 
A. Overview 
Although prior user rights, which are usually conceptualized as providing 
fairness to an earlier inventor in a first-to-file patent system,30 are part of most 
global patent systems,31 their key features, such as the scope and elements of the 
defense, vary greatly. For instance, in France and Belgium, mere possession of the 
inventive idea is sufficient to establish prior use.32 However, in other countries, 
                                                          
27 See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 11, at 388–92 (suggesting how market life of a product 
and ease of its reverse engineering influence attractiveness of patent vs. trade secret protection). 
28 Letter from Leah Taylor, VP, Intellectual Property, Hospira Inc., to Elizabeth Shaw, United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/pur-2011nov08-hospira_inc.pdf [hereinafter Hospira Comments on Prior User 
Rights]. 
29 “On average, patents are not the most important mechanism of IP appropriation while secrecy 
and lead are.” Bronwyn Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A 
Literature Review, 52 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 22 (2014). 
30 “The reason most frequently cited in support of prior user rights in a first-inventor-to-file 
regime is ensuring “fairness”—appropriately balancing the equitable interests of the prior user and the 
patentee.” DAVID J. KAPPOS & TERESA STANEK REA, THE UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, THE REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE 50 (2012) [hereinafter USPTO REPORT]. 
31  
 [T]here is no question that prior user rights are unanimously recognized in 
principle as just and desirable in a first-to-file system. The rights are argued 
to be justified on grounds of both fairness and efficiency. They prevent the 
destruction of existing investments, which is in the public interest, and they 
give a measure of protection to the vested interests of those who have learned 
nothing from the disclosure of the invention in the patent application. 
Sylvie Strobel, Prior User Rights: Introductory Comments, 35 IDEA 207, 208 (1994). 
32 PATRICK VAN EECKE ET AL., MONITORING AND ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIMES AND THEIR USE 104–05 (2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/monitoring_and_analysis_of_technology_ 
transfer_and_intellectual_property_regimes_and_their_use.pdf. 
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active commercial use of the invention is required.33 With respect to the duration of 
prior use, the Italian Patent Act requires at least one year of such use before the 
effective filing date of the patent,34 whereas most other systems simply require use 
before the filing date. 
Since the meaning of key terms, such as “use,” “preparation for business,” or 
“commercial use,” is often not statutorily defined, judicial interpretation of a prior 
use provision often determines the shape and scope of the defense. For instance, in 
Japan, use of the defense is quite common, while in the United Kingdom, use of a 
defense based on a similarly worded statute is rare.35 Comparing the use of the 
prior user defense in these two industrialized countries with similar statutes 
illustrates this point, demonstrates the nature of prior user cases, and poses 
questions that have yet to be resolved in the United States.  
B. Japan: Robust Prior User Rights 
Codified in § 79 of the Japanese Patent Act,36 prior user rights have been a 
part of the Japanese patent system since 1909.37 A recent survey of Japanese 
corporations shows a robust and growing use of the defense38 that accelerated after 
the Supreme Court of Japan clarified its scope in the 1986 landmark case Walking 
                                                          
33 Id. at 100–02. 
34 Id. at 98. 
35 Letter from Jason Albert, Associate General Counsel, Microsoft Corp., United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-
2011nov08-microsoft_corporation.pdf [hereinafter Comments of Microsoft Corp.]. 
36  
A person who, without knowledge of the content of an invention claimed in a 
patent application, made an invention identical to said invention, or a person 
who, without knowledge of the content of an invention claimed in a patent 
application, learned the invention from a person who made an invention 
identical to said invention and has been working the invention or preparing 
for the working of the invention in Japan at the time of the filing of the patent 
application, shall have a non-exclusive license on the patent right, only to the 
extent of the invention and the purpose of such business worked or prepared.  
Naoki Yoshida, Lessons We Can Learn from Prior User Right in Japan, AIPLA (2012), http://www 
.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-Japan/Committee%20Documents/2012% 
20MWI%20Pre-Meeting%20Seminar/AIPLA%20MWI%202012%20Presentation%20by%20AIPPI% 
20Naoki%20Yoshida.pdf (quoting Japanese Patent Law, art. 79). 
37 Hiroo Maeda, New Framework for Protection and Management of Knowledge, 2006 IIP BULL. 
50 (2006), http://www.iip.or.jp/e/e_summary/pdf/detail2005/e17_07.pdf. 
38 Id. at 52. 
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Beam Type Heating.39 In that case, the defendant possessed blueprints of a heating 
furnace and used them in several contract bids.40 Even though the initial bid, 
presented around March 31, 1966, was unsuccessful, the Supreme Court held that 
possession of the specifications of a product and their use in commercial 
negotiations is sufficient to establish the “preparation for business” element of the 
prior user defense, and the date of the bid can be used to establish the date of the 
invention’s prior use.41 The court further held that the prior user is permitted to 
expand the scope of the use within the bounds of the technical concept embedded 
in the invention, in other words, that the prior user is not bound by the exact 
boundaries of the original, pre-patent use.42 This expansive judicial interpretation 
of the elements and scope of the defense likely had a major impact on its use in 
litigation. The percentage of cases in which the prior user prevailed increased in the 
aftermath of the case.43 One-third of large Japanese firms, responding to a 
subsequent survey, reported having used prior user rights either in litigation or 
settlement negotiation.44 
Several factors account for the robust use of the prior user defense in Japan. 
First, this defense has been a part of the Japanese patent system for over a 
century.45 Second, Japanese courts, including the Supreme Court of Japan, 
articulated expansive and reasonably clear standards for the elements and scope of 
the defense.46 Finally, the Japanese business community is aware of the defense 
and the applicable standards.47 However, the use of prior user rights is not uniform 
across industries: manufacturers of electronics and electric equipment reported 
greater use of the rights than pharmaceutical companies.48 Notably, protection of 
proprietary technology from foreign competition is one of the reasons for reliance 
                                                          
39 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 3, 1986, Hei S61 (O) no. 454, 40 Saikō Saibansho Minji 
Hanreishū [Minshū] 1068 (Japan). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1. 
42 Id. at 2. 
43 Maeda, supra note 37, at 54. 
44 Id. at 52. 
45 Id. at 50. 
46 See id. at 53–54. 
47 Id. at 52. 
48 Id. 
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on prior user rights.49 This rationale resonates with the concerns that several global 
corporations voiced during the debates that preceded the passage of the AIA.50 
C. United Kingdom: Narrow Judicial Interpretation of Prior User Rights 
The U.K. experience with prior user rights contrasts sharply with that of 
Japan. There are very few reported U.K. cases in which the defense was utilized,51 
and none in which the defense was successful. The prior user defense was 
introduced to the U.K. with the enactment of § 64 of the Patent Act of 1977.52 On 
the face of the statute, the scope of the defense appears broad, as it covers not only 
those who actually practiced the invention, but those who made “effective and 
serious preparation to do such an act.”53 However, narrow judicial interpretation of 
that crucial term has proved decisive: the defense has failed in every one of the few 
reported cases. 
                                                          
49 See id. at 50, 57. 
50 See, e.g., infra notes 113, 114, 118. 
51 Comments of Microsoft Corp., supra note 35. 
52  
64. Right to continue use begun before priority date. 
(1) Where a patent is granted for an invention, a person who in the 
United Kingdom before the priority date of the invention does in good 
faith an act which would constitute an infringement of the patent if it 
were in force, or makes in good faith effective and serious 
preparations to do such an act, shall have the rights conferred by 
subsection (2) below. 
(2) Any such person shall have the right— 
(a) to continue to do or, as the case may be, to do that act 
himself; and 
(b) if it was done or preparations had been made to do it in the 
course of a business, to assign the right to do it or to transmit that right 
on his death or, in the case of a body corporate on its dissolution, to 
any person who acquires that part of the business in the course of 
which the act was done or preparations had been made to do it, or to 
authorise it to be done by any partners of his for the time being in that 
business; and the doing of that act by virtue of this subsection shall not 
amount to an infringement of the patent concerned. 
(3) The rights mentioned in subsection (2) above shall not include the 
right to grant a licence to any person to do an act so mentioned. 
(4) Where a patented product is disposed of by any person to another 
in exercise of a right conferred by subsection (2) above, that other and 
any person claiming through him shall be entitled to deal with the 
product in the same way as if it had been disposed of by a sole 
registered proprietor. 
Patents Act 1977, 1977, c.37, § 64. 
53 Id. § 64(1)(b). 
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In the first reported case, Helitune Ltd. v. Stewart Hughes Ltd.,54 the trial 
court considered what constitutes “effective and serious preparation” and set a 
demanding standard. In that case, Helitune obtained a patent on an active tracker, a 
device for tracking imbalance of helicopter blades, and sued the defendant for 
manufacturing and selling infringing devices.55 The defendant showed that it 
produced a working prototype of the active tracker and made plans for its mass 
production before the Helitune patent’s priority date.56 The court held that 
possession of a working prototype was insufficient to establish the “effective 
preparation” element and that to claim the defense, one must be very close to 
commercial sale,57 although the court did not explain how close. This opinion 
announced a demanding and uncertain standard for what the court called “statutory 
license”58—the prior user defense. 
In a later case, Lubrizol Co. v. Esso Petroleum Co.,59 an appellate court 
affirmed the high threshold for the effective preparation prong of the prior use 
defense. Lubrizol sued the Exxon/Esso family of companies for infringement of its 
patented lubricant.60 Exxon asserted that before the priority date of the patent, it 
imported the lubricant into the United Kingdom, tested it, and made substantial 
preparations for building a production plant.61 However, the court held that those 
activities were not sufficient to satisfy the “effective preparation test,” which it 
defined vaguely as “preparations . . . so advanced as to be about to result in the 
infringing act being done.”62 
In Lubrizol, the court addressed another important question: whether the prior 
user can expand the scope of its use into other products after the patent’s priority 
date. Judge Aldous ruled that the prior user essentially could not expand the use, 
because “the right given by . . . section 64 [of Patents Act] cannot be a right to 
manufacture any product nor a right to expand into other products.”63 In a later 
                                                          
54 [1991] F.S.R. 171 (Eng.). 
55 Id. at 172. 
56 Id. at 206–07. 
57 Id. at 208. 
58 Id. at 206. 
59 [1998] R.P.C. 727 (CA). 
60 Id. at 727–28. 
61 Id. at 739, 770. 
62 Id. at 770. 
63 However, the judge left room for some flexibility or rather uncertainty, “I do not believe that 
identicality [of pre- and post-patent products of prior user] is required.” Id. 
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case, Forticere Ltd. v. Lafarge Roofing Ltd.,64 a lower court followed the Lubrizol 
opinion65 and held that the prior user was effectively locked into the uses and 
products that existed as of the patent priority date.66 
Unlike in Japan, the U.K. prior user defense is of little use. Several factors 
explain this outcome, including judicial imposition of a vague yet demanding 
standard on the effective preparation prong and the permissible scope of expansion 
or modification of use, which remains an unresolved issue. Comparing the 
experiences of Japan and the U.K. not only highlights key issues in implementing 
the prior user defense, but also illustrates the pivotal role of judicial interpretation 
of the statute. 
III. HISTORY OF THE PRIOR USER DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Prior User Rights Debates Before Adoption of the AIA 
The path of the prior user rights defense provision into the final text of the 
AIA was long and convoluted,67 even though some form of the defense is a part of 
many foreign first-to-file patent systems.68 Significant debate over the first inventor 
rights took place in the early 1990s,69 in the context of movement towards 
harmonization of the U.S. patent system with major foreign systems, including the 
                                                          
64 [2005] EWHC 3024 (Ch). 
65 Lafarge produced evidence that in 1985 it designed and manufactured tiles which would 
infringe on Forticere’s patent with priority date of January 14, 1988. Id. ¶ 7. Although Lafarge 
abandoned Theta line in 1989, in 2002 it started to manufacture Duoplan tiles which were based on 
Theta, albeit modified, and infringed the same claim of Forticere’s patent. Id. ¶ 18. The court found that 
elements of prior user defense would be satisfied with regard to Theta, but not Duoplan, i.e., that prior 
user was effectively locked into the uses and products as of the patent priority date. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. 
66 Although the court acknowledged Judge Aldous’s dicta in Lubrizol Co. v. Esso Petroleum Co., 
[1998] R.P.C. 727 (CA), which allowed for some extension of prior use, it found that the particular 
change of design is extension beyond permissible zone. Forticere Ltd. v. Lafarge Roofing Ltd., [2005] 
EWHC 3024, ¶ 25 (Ch). 
67 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II, 21 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 539, 551–61 (2012) [hereinafter AIA Legislative History II]; prior user rights were part of the U.S. 
patent system from 1836 to 1952. USPTO REPORT, supra note 30, at 30. However, since 1952, several 
legislative attempts to reinstate prior user rights as a part of the U.S. patent regime had failed, including 
a Bill proposed in 1967. See David H. Hollander, The First Inventor Defense: A Limited Prior User 
Right Finds Its Way into U.S. Patent Law, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 37, 80 (2002). 
68 “All European Union countries except one recognize prior user rights in some form.” 
Comments of Microsoft Corp., supra note 35, at 2. For a detailed comparison of the prior user rights in 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States, see USPTO REPORT, supra note 30, at 30. 
69 See Kupferschmid, supra note 6, at 213 (summarizing arguments for and against introduction 
of prior user rights in the context of the debates on harmonization of the U.S. patent system). 
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change to a first-to-file regime.70 The proponents of first user rights pointed out that 
in first-to-file patent systems, those rights provide fairness71 because they allow a 
first inventor, typically an individual who lost the race to the patent office to a 
following inventor, often a major corporation, to continue using the fruit of the 
prior inventor’s ingenuity.72 Furthermore, those rights provide an inventor with a 
less expensive way to protect the invention, trade secret, which could be expected 
to ease the flood of defensive patent applications for low quality incremental 
inventions and improvements.73 Finally, some argued that since trade secret is the 
preferred option of large corporations, if the defense was not enacted, those 
companies might move their business to jurisdictions that offer robust prior user 
rights.74 
However, opponents of prior user rights pointed out that tilting the scale in 
favor of trade secret protection discourages public disclosure and transfer of 
knowledge, diminishes the value of a patent, and may be incompatible with the 
constitutional mandate to promote useful arts.75 Yet commentators conceded that 
                                                          
70 Hollander, supra note 67, at 80–81; Griswold & Ubel, supra note 6, at 567–68. 
71 Lemley, supra note 16, at 33 (“[W]e might want to implement an independent invention 
defense or at least some form of prior user right, . . . as a matter of equity—manufacturers can 
reasonably object to paying for technology they developed themselves and did not copy.”). 
72 See, e.g., Kupferschmid, supra note 6, at 217–19. 
73 Id. at 212–28. 
74 “Prior user rights are needed to protect and encourage domestic investment and 
commercialization in these inventions. Without this protection the inventor may instead choose to locate 
his investment in a jurisdiction which has a prior user right.” Griswold & Ubel, supra note 6, at 592. 
“[A]ny suppression of inventions that the new legislation may cause will be outweighed by the 
benefits. . . . The new legislation will promote the development of new technologies, put U.S. inventors 
on equal footing with their foreign counterparts, and further the United States’ harmonization efforts.” 
Morico, supra note 6, at 580. 
75 See Robert L. Rohrback, Prior User Rights: Roses or Thorns?, 2 U. BALT. INTELL. POP. L.J. 1, 
12–25 (1993). Another commentator notes: 
[T]he addition of the prior user defense needlessly abandoned the path of 
advancing the useful arts, and sent the patent system down the path of 
increased value of trade secrets and decreased the value of patent rights. 
Unfortunately, this path inherently encourages secrecy and discourages 
innovation that would otherwise be furthered by public disclosure of 
inventions.  
Hill, supra note 6, at 548. 
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some form of the rights exists in most foreign patent systems76 without generating 
much litigation.77 
An unrelated event catalyzed the legislative adoption of a limited version of 
the defense in 1999.78 In a 1998 case, State Street & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. 
Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed availability of patent protection for 
business methods, including computational methods used in financial 
transactions.79 Before that landmark case, those methods were widely believed to 
be ineligible for patent protection.80 Since the patent holder for such a method 
would be able to enjoin other users, including prior users, who failed to patent it, 
State Street created anxiety in business circles81 and catalyzed the introduction of 
limited prior user rights.82 
Legislators responded to this political pressure by providing a prior user 
defense in the America Inventors Protection Act (“AIPA”) of 1999.83 The initial 
version of the legislation, House Bill 400, introduced in 1997, included a broad first 
inventor defense provision with no subject matter limitation.84 The bill faced much 
opposition, however, and that provision was sharply criticized, especially by 
                                                          
76 Lisa M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent 
Law Harmonization: An Analysis and Proposal 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 523, 536–39 
(1990). 
77  
Even though prior user rights are comparatively easy to assert in the 
European Union, there is no evidence of significant litigation relating to such 
rights. For example, the United Kingdom has had a prior user defense since 
1977; to our knowledge, the defense has been asserted in only five cases. 
Comments of Microsoft Corp., supra note 35, at 5. 
78 Hollander, supra note 67, at 81. 
79 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that “business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal 
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”). 
80 Hollander, supra note 67, at 83–84. 
81 “Firms that had long maintained their proprietary business procedures and processes as trade 
secrets suddenly faced the risk of infringing the exclusive rights of competitors who might legitimately 
obtain patent protection on the same methods.” JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 411 (Aspen 
Publishers 3d ed. 2009). 
82 USPTO REPORT, supra note 30, at 6. 
83 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
84 H.R. 400, 105th Cong. § 1961 (1997); see also Hollander, supra note 67, at 81. 
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Representative Dana Rohrabacher, who believed that the defense would hurt small 
inventors and promote the concealment of innovation.85 
As a result of extensive debate and political compromise, a new House Bill, 
H.R. 1907, the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), was adopted in 1999.86 
Although in the original text of the bill the prior user defense was extended to any 
patentable process,87 the House unexpectedly limited the scope of the defense to 
business methods only.88 As a result, the AIPA provided for the first inventor 
defense89 only for “a method of doing or conducting business.”90 
To date, the prior user defense has had very limited application in U.S. 
courts.91 This may be because under the pre-AIA first-to-invent regime, the first 
inventor usually attempted to assert full rights to patent rather than turning to the 
prior user defense.92 Finally, since many business methods are non-patentable,93 
there are few patent infringement claims to defend against. 
                                                          
85 145 CONG. REC. 19176 (1999) (statement of Rep. Rohrbacker). 
86 145 CONG. REC. H6973 (Aug. 4, 1999). See also Hollander, supra note 67, at 82–83. 
87 Hollander, supra note 67, at 81–82. 
88  
[First inventor defense] is limited . . . to the State Street Bank case. There 
was some discussion early on that. Perhaps the first inventive defense should 
apply to processes as well as methods. But we finally concluded that we 
would restrict it to methods only, and that, by having done that, we were able 
to satisfy some folks who were opposed to the bill otherwise. 
145 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Coble, sponsor of the bill). 
89 The statute provides: 
It shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section 271 of this 
title with respect to any subject matter that would otherwise infringe one or 
more claims for a method in the patent being asserted against a person, if 
such person had, acting in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to 
practice at least 1 year before the effective filing date of such patent, and 
commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date of such 
patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2000). 
90 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2000). 
91 In one pre-AIA district court case, the court ruled that the defense is applicable only to 
methods, not to machines. Sabasta v Buckaroos, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (holding 
that the defense is limited to business methods, not to articles of manufacture). 
92 In the first-to-invent system, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000) (abrogated by AIA), the first 
inventor, who did not conceal or suppress the invention could assert full rights to patent on the invention 
against a later inventor who was first to file. If successful, the first inventor would obtain ownership of 
the patent for the invention with complete right to exclude other users. On the other hand, prior user 
defense under 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006), has a much narrower scope: if successful in asserting the defense, 
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B. AIA Reform 
The legislative history of the AIA, which revamped the U.S. patent system 
and introduced the current version of the prior user defense, is complex. The first 
version of the bill, designed to be the first major reform of the U.S. patent system 
since 1952, was introduced by Representative Lamar Smith in June 2005.94 The bill 
proposed to change the U.S. patent system from first-to-invent to first-to-file. 
The change increased the importance of prior user rights as a fairness remedy 
for a first inventor who was not the first to file and could not obtain a patent but 
who should be entitled to practice his or her invention.95 After legislative battles 
spanning several congressional sessions, the bill passed the House on June 23, 
2011, and a compromise version was adopted by the Senate on September 8, 
2011.96 President Barack Obama signed the bill into law on September 16, 2011.97 
C. Floor Debates on Prior User Defense 
Senator Jon Kyl, one of the co-sponsors of the bill, described the purpose of 
the legislation and explained that prior user rights are an important feature of the 
new law: 
                                                                                                                                      
the first user, who does not have to be the first inventor, can practice the invention but the patentee 
keeps the patent rights and can assert them against anyone else but the first inventor. Essentially, under 
the prior user defense, the prior user receives a compulsory free license with certain restrictions on the 
scope of commercial use. So, under the pre-AIA first-to-invent system, the former option was much 
more attractive. In fact, that option has a seen significant number of cases. Thus, according to the 
research of Lex Machina, between January 1, 2005 and October 15, 2011, there were about ninety 
federal cases involving 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) issues. See Written Comment of Cisco Systems Inc. on 
behalf of The Coalition for Patent Fairness, Exhibit A (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/pur-2011oct25-cisco.pdf [hereinafter Cisco Comments]. 
93 The main obstacle for patentability of business methods is involvement of human behavior, 
which currently excludes them from patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). See Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that a computational method of commodity trading is not 
patentable). Furthermore, some business methods may be non-eligible for patent protection because they 
lack novelty or non-obviousness within the meaning of the Patent Act, for instance, because they consist 
of obvious, albeit commercially successful, combination of prior art. 
94 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I, 21 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 435, 438 (2012) [hereinafter AIA Legislative History I]. 
95 “The reason most frequently cited in support of prior user rights in a first-inventor-to-file 
regime is ensuring “fairness”—appropriately balancing the equitable interests of the prior user and the 
patentee.” USPTO REPORT, supra note 30, at 50. 
96 AIA Legislative History I, supra note 94, at 446–47. 
97 Id. at 443–47. 
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The overarching purpose and effect of the present bill is 
to create a patent system that is clearer, fairer, more 
transparent, and more objective. . . . 
By adopting the first-to-file system, for example, the bill 
creates a rule that is clear and easy to comply with and 
that avoids the need for expensive discovery and 
litigation over what a patent’s priority date is. By 
adopting a simple definition of the term “prior art,” the 
bill will make it easier to assess whether a patent is valid 
and cheaper for an inventor to enforce his patent. By 
recognizing a limited prior user right, the bill creates a 
powerful incentive for manufacturers to build factories 
and create jobs in this country.98 
As Senator Kyl indicated, the debates over the bill took place during the 
economic downturn, which resulted in an unemployment rate of approximately 
nine percent.99 The objectives of stimulating the creation and retention of American 
jobs, as well as maintaining the global competitiveness of U.S. innovation,100 
colored the debates over prior user rights. 
Several diverse policy objectives shaped these debates as well as the final text 
of the prior user provision. Understanding these objectives is important because the 
statutory provision does not have significant grounding in prior case law.101 
                                                          
98 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
99 “If you look at unemployment, unemployment is more than 9 percent, and it has been more 
than 9 percent for an extended period of time. Weekly jobless claims: more than 400,000. We have more 
than 14 million people who are out of work.” 157 CONG. REC. S5412 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(statement by Rep. Hoeven). 
100  
Yesterday, I commended Austan Goolsbee, the chair of the President’s 
Council of Economic Advisers, for his white board presentation this week on 
the importance of patent reform to help America win the global competition 
and create jobs. The creation of more than 220,000 jobs in the private sector 
last month, the creation of 1.5 million jobs over the last 12 months, and the 
unemployment rate finally being reduced to 8.9 percent are all signs that the 
efforts we have made over the last 2 years to stave off the worst recession 
since the Great Depression are paying off and the economic recovery is 
taking hold. 
157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement by Rep. Leahy, co-sponsor of the Act). 
101 “[N]o one can gainsay the overwhelming judicial support for the proposition that explanations 
by sponsors of legislation during floor discussion are entitled to weight when they cast light on the 
construction properly to be placed upon statutory language.” Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor 
Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 967 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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Representative Lamar Smith consistently articulated three reasons to include an 
expansive prior user defense in the AIA. First, he emphasized that in the first-to-
file regime, the defense was meant to safeguard the right of the original inventor 
who had decided to keep the invention secret to practice the invention even if a 
later inventor patented it.102 Second, the defense was designed to protect 
“substantial investments in the development and preparation of proprietary 
technologies,”103 notably in the semiconductor industry. Finally, since this defense 
existed in most foreign patent systems, its introduction in the United States would 
harmonize the U.S. system with foreign ones, and would simplify corporate 
compliance across borders.104 
Congressional debates highlighted additional reasons to adopt the prior user 
defense. Legislators indicated that one of the purposes behind the defense was to 
create an incentive for global corporations to keep and create high paying jobs in 
the United States in order to take advantage of the additional protection for their 
proprietary technologies.105 This protection could shield those technologies from 
being copied and infringed upon overseas, where such infringement is difficult to 
detect or prosecute. Senator Kyl illustrated this objective: 
This new defense will ensure that the first inventor of a 
new process, or of a product used in a manufacturing 
process, can continue to use the invention in a 
commercial process even if a subsequent inventor later 
patents the idea. For many manufacturing processes the 
patent system presents a Catch-22. If the manufacturer 
patents the process, he effectively discloses it to the 
world. But patents for processes that are used in closed 
factories are difficult to police. It is all but impossible to 
know if someone in a factory in China, for example, is 
infringing such a patent. . . . Patenting such 
manufacturing processes effectively amounts to giving 
away the invention to foreign manufacturers.106 
                                                          
102 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. E1219 (daily ed. June 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
103 Id. 
104 See 157 CONG. REC. H4483 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
105 157 CONG. REC. S5426 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Blunt). 
106 157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Rep. Blunt offered 
an illustration from another industry: 
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D. Prior User Defense Debates: Political Pressures 
In the course of a five-year long legislative marathon to reform the U.S. 
patent system, there was significant political input from large corporations, 
universities, startup companies, and individual inventors regarding prior user 
rights.107 These positions on prior user rights can be elicited from their 
congressional hearing testimonies and the formal responses to the USPTO study on 
prior user defense commissioned by Congress.108 
In general, large corporations supported the provision while universities and 
individual inventors opposed it.109 The corporations raised a concern, shared by 
legislators,110 about lack of protection for patented American inventions overseas, 
and praised the idea of using trade secrets as an alternative protection. 
                                                                                                                                      
To specifically illustrate let us consider that U.S. researchers are leading the 
world in discovering genetic markers that are associated with important 
agronomic traits which serves as breeding production tools. Instead of 
teaching foreign competitors these production tools, a preferred alternative 
may be to rely on prior user rights for such innovative crop breeding 
technology which is used in the manufacture of new plant varieties although 
the use may only occur once a year after each growing season and for many 
years to selectively manufacture a perfected crop product that is sold.  
157 CONG. REC. S5427 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Blunt). 
107 As with the creation of the prior user rights defense in the AIPA, the limited expansion of the 
defense in the AIA sparked heated debate. Proponents of the defense argued that the defense is 
necessary in a competitive economy and strikes the balance between trade secret and patent protection. 
Furthermore, the proponents asserted that a prior user defense is necessary in a first-inventor-to-file 
regime to provide inventors who put inventions to practice first with the ability to continue using their 
innovations, even though they may not be entitled to a patent. Critics argue, however, that prior user 
rights undermine the purpose of the patent system by creating a strong incentive to protect innovations 
as trade secrets rather than disclose them and fuel technological growth in the United States. USPTO 
REPORT, supra note 30, at 8. 
108 Id. at 1–2. 
109 Legislative History I, supra note 94, at 559–61 (providing highlights of universities’ 
opposition to prior user defense from 1992 to 2011). 
110  
The prior user rights defense, in general, is important for American 
manufacturers because it protects companies that invent and use a 
technology, whether embodied in a process or product, but choose not to 
disclose the invention through the patenting process, and instead rely on trade 
secret protection. The use of trade secrets instead of patenting may be 
justified in certain instances to avoid, for example, the misappropriation by 
third parties where detection of that usage may be difficult. These companies 
should be permitted to continue to practice the invention, even if another 
party later invents and patents the same invention. 
157 CONG. REC. S5440 (Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Leahy). 
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Consequently, these corporations supported the prior user defense as protective of 
the secrecy of an invention.111 On the other hand, universities and individual 
inventors, which do not use inventions for commerce or manufacturing, insisted 
that the provision would disproportionately and negatively affect non-profit 
research.112 
However, the precise position of corporations on the issue of prior user rights 
varied across industries. For instance, Hospira, a global pharmaceutical company, 
praised the adoption of prior user rights as an important step towards harmonization 
with global patent regimes.113 A global telecommunications company, Cisco, also 
strongly asserted the importance of prior user rights114 because of global 
competition, world-wide disclosure of inventions patented in the United States, and 
the danger of IP piracy.115 Microsoft confessed lack of experience with prior user 
rights116 and expressed a generic commitment to strong patent protection.117 Such 
differences are consistent with results of several surveys that indicate how 
pharmaceutical companies tend to use trade secrets more than the software 
industry.118 The viability of trade secret protection of IP varies across industries119 
                                                          
111 “[I]nclusion of prior user rights is essential to ensure that those who have invented and used a 
technology but choose not to disclose that technology—generally to ensure that they not disclose their 
trade secrets to foreign competitors—are provided a defense against someone who later patents the 
technology.” CONG. REC. E1219 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (speech by Rep. Smith). 
112 AIA Legislative History II, supra note 63, at 560–61; see also Comments from Neil Thomas, 
to the USPTO, Prior User Rights, 1 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-
2011nov08-neil_thomas.pdf. 
113 Hospira Comments on Prior User Rights, supra note 28. 
114  
Particularly in this current economic climate, it is important to encourage—
and not create barriers that stifle—continued investments in U.S. industry. 
Cisco and the Coalition for Patent Fairness respectfully request that the 
Office strongly support robust prior user rights and confirm that the prior 
user rights provided by the Act have the breadth to fully address the concerns 
noted above. 
Cisco Comments, supra note 92, at D. 
115 Some American businesses may also determine that it is more beneficial to forego patent 
protection in the United States in favor of trade secret protection. To obtain patent protection for an 
innovation, an inventor must disclose that innovation to the public. However, while the disclosure is 
effectively world-wide, the patent protection is limited to the United States. Therefore, businesses 
competing against foreign companies, or in markets outside the United States, may be better served by 
keeping some innovations private. Id. at A. 
116 Comments of Microsoft Corp., supra note 35, at 2. 
117 Id. at 7. 
118 “Patent protection may not be desirable in other circumstances where disclosure can have 
adverse consequences. For example, disclosing search engine algorithms would facilitate gaming the 
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and according to the types of inventions to be protected.120 Furthermore, this is in 
line with the results of studies that show that all things being equal, large 
businesses tend to prefer trade secrecy to patent protection.121 
There were differences of opinion among institutions of higher learning as 
well. The Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, a technology transfer agent of 
the University of Wisconsin, sharply criticized the adoption of prior user rights as 
unconstitutional.122 However, the University of California saw the main problem 
with the new law as the lack of clear definition, rather than adoption of prior user 
rights per se.123 A joint statement of several institutions of higher learning, while 
                                                                                                                                      
results. On the other hand, secrecy is ineffective where the technology can be readily reverse-
engineered. Where regulatory approval is needed, secrecy is impossible.” Comments of Computer and 
Communications Industry Ass’n Pursuant to the Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments 
on the Study of Prior User Rights, 3 (2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-2011nov08-
ccia.pdf [hereinafter CCIA Comments]. 
119 J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 927 (2011) 
(“[S]tratification of value across industry and innovation type indicates that secrecy is more valuable in 
industries in which it is available (including software, manufacturing, chemicals) and certain invention 
types that are less revealing (methods and processes) while patents provide more private value for other 
industries (pharmaceuticals, consumer products) and invention types (product innovations).”).  
120 See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 11, at 388–406 (discussing seventeen factors affecting 
the relative value of patent protection over trade secret protection, including market value of the 
product, likelihood of reverse engineering, type of invention, difficulty and cost of maintaining secrecy, 
expense and time to obtain patent protection, difficulty of maintaining secrecy of the invention, 
economic risks of losing trade secret, employee mobility, and industry custom). 
121 “In any well-run operating firm, secrecy of internal operations is the default: Employee 
contracts and conventional controls on access to facilities work efficiently in concert with the law of 
trade secrets to preserve secrecy, especially in industrial processes. Once basic precautions and routines 
are established, the zone of protection can be expanded indefinitely at little additional cost. The legal 
protection offered by trade secret law reduces the costs of investing in physical restrictions on access 
and exhaustive contracting to protect specific information.” CCIA Comments, supra note 118, at 2. 
122 In WARF’s view, there are serious legal and constitutional issues associated with placing trade 
secret law in the patent law, and through that assimilation, granting non-inventors coexclusive rights for 
unlimited times. Based on a plain meaning reading of Section 5 of the AIA, along with constitutional 
text and relevant case law, WARF submits that inserting trade secret law into patent law suffers from 
serious constitutional infirmities. Comments of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Found. In the Matter of 
Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Study of Prior User Rights, 2 (Nov. 3, 2011) 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-2011nov04-wisconsin_alumni_research_foundation.pdf. 
123 “The new law creates added uncertainty due to new interpretations of what the law means that 
will likely arise during its implementation. Uncertainty favors well-financed parties who can stretch out 
litigation based upon that uncertainty, regardless of the actual merits of the defense in that particular 
case.” The Regents of the Univ. of California, Written Comments on Prior User Rights to U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, 1–2 (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-2011nov07-
university_of_ca.pdf. 
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acknowledging their skepticism, posited that prior user rights have a positive role 
to play.124 
Finally, individual inventors pointed out that prior user rights create 
uncertainty about enforcement of patent rights and, consequently, about their value. 
One commentator claimed that “‘prior user rights’ [would] diminish the value of all 
patents”125 and, therefore, would make it more difficult for an innovative startup 
company to obtain access to venture capital, which is a strong motive for 
patenting.126 Other parties countered that such negative side effects of prior user 
rights have not been observed in other countries, such as France, that have had a 
more expansive version of those rights for decades.127  
                                                          
124  
[O]ver the course of the more than six-year effort to reform U.S. patent law, 
the university community came to recognize the importance to some private 
sector companies of the availability of a prior use defense to patent 
infringement extending beyond the limitation to business method patents. In 
complex products and manufacturing processes, many containing hundreds 
or even thousands of patented components, it may not make sense to patent 
every component or process. Such products or processes can become 
vulnerable to a charge of infringement from a patent acquisition company, 
threatening an entire product based on an unpatented component. An 
appropriately structured prior user rights scheme could provide legitimate 
protection against such threats.  
Higher Education Comments on Prior User Rights, 1 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
aia_implementation/pur-2011nov08-higher-education-associations.pdf. 
125 E-mail Comment from Neil Thomas to US Patent and Trademark Office on Prior User Rights, 
1 (Nov. 8, 2011). http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/pur-2011nov08-neil_thomas.pdf. 
126  
In an important showing, we demonstrate that patenting may play a 
previously underappreciated role in helping startups to secure investment 
from various sources of entrepreneurial capital, including not only angel and 
venture investors, but also “friends and family” and commercial banks. Also 
notable is our finding that the costs of prosecuting and enforcing patents are a 
substantial barrier to technology entrepreneurs attempting to access the patent 
system. But the explanation for startups choosing not to patent is also 
context-specific: biotechnology company executives are much more likely to 
cite concerns about information disclosure than those in other industries. 
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1262 (2009).  
127 Comments of Microsoft Corp., supra note 35, at 3. 
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E. Compromise with the Universities and the Final Text 
Although the initial AIA version of the prior user right provision introduced 
in the House bill in March 2011 was much broader than in AIPA (1999),128 a 
compromise with universities resulted in a narrow defense with numerous 
exceptions and limitations, including a one-year minimum requirement for prior 
use.129 Senator Kyl commented on the resulting changes in the text of the House 
bill: “The compromise reached in the House of Representatives addresses 
university concerns by requiring a defendant to show that he commercially used the 
subject matter that infringes the patent at least 1 year before the patent owner either 
filed an application or disclosed the invention to the public.”130 In the Senate, the 
scope of the defense was narrowed even further; it completely exempted 
university-owned patents from the prior user defense.131 Even though that 
exemption removed the very rationale for the stringent one-year requirement and 
other limitations introduced in the House bill, those limitations remained in the 
text.132  
IV. PRIOR USER RIGHTS IN THE AIA: PUZZLES OF THE FINAL TEXT 
A. Elements of the Defense 
1. Eligible Subject Matter 
The final text of § 273 (AIA) limits the subject matter eligible for the prior 
user defense to a “process, . . . machine, manufacture, or composition of matter 
used in a manufacturing or other commercial process” in the United States.133 The 
new statute excludes consumer products, which are not a part of a commercial 
                                                          
128 AIA Legislative History II, supra note 67, at 560–61. 
129 Commentators criticized limiting of the scope of prior user defense: 
A better solution would be to grant blanket prior user rights to first inventors. 
Doing so would place holders of patented inventions and trade secrets on 
equal footing: patentees would be able to exclude others from using a 
patented invention, except for those inventors that invented prior to the patent 
application. Similarly, trade secret holders could operate knowing that later-
filed patents would not subject them to infringement liability or the inability 
to practice their own invention. 
Anderson, supra note 119, at 971. 
130 157 CONG. REC. S5430 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
131 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5) (2012). 
132 AIA Legislative History II, supra note 67, at 560–61, 566–67. 
133 35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2012). 
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process.134 The range of eligible subject matter is much broader than it was in the 
AIPA,135 which restricted protection to “methods of conducting business”136 only. 
2. “Commercial Use in the United States” 
Prior “commercial use” of the invention in the United States is a necessary 
element of the defense, yet it is not defined in the statute, except that a use “in 
connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length sale”137 
satisfies the element. Furthermore, “premarketing regulatory review,”138 such as the 
FDA approval process, and use by a non-profit entity, such as a hospital or 
laboratory,139 are forms of commercial use for purposes of the statute. The statute is 
silent on what distinguishes “commercial use” from, for instance, an internal 
research project, preparatory steps, or experimental use.140 
Materials from the congressional debates shed light on the intended meaning 
of the “commercial use” of an invention. Legislators were aware that the provision 
does not clearly explain what constitutes “commercial use.”141 Over the course of 
                                                          
134  
Subsection (a) expands the defense beyond just processes to also cover 
products that are used in a manufacturing or other commercial process. 
Generally, products that are sold to consumers will not need a PCU [prior 
commercial use] defense over the long term. As soon as the product is sold to 
the public, any invention that is embodied or otherwise inherent in that 
product becomes prior art and cannot be patented by another party, or even 
by the maker of the product after the grace period has expired. Some 
products, however, consist of tools or other devices that are used only by the 
inventor inside his closed factory. Others consist of substances that are 
exhausted in a manufacturing process and never become accessible to the 
public. Such products will not become prior art. Revised section 273 
therefore allows the defense to be asserted with respect to such products. 
157 CONG. REC. S5430 (Sept. 8, 2011) (Statement of Sen. Kyl). 
135 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3) (2000). 
136 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2000). 
137 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2012). 
138 35 U.S.C. § 273(c)(1) (2012). 
139 Id. 
140 AIA Legislative History II, supra note 67, at 564. 
141  
[T]he utility and reliability of section 5 is dependent on the prior use being an 
“internal commercial use”—a term for which there is no readily available 
judicial precedent. Should section 5 of H.R. 1249 become law, an innovator 
and his legal counsel need some reasonable assurance that an internal use 
will, in fact, be deemed to be a commercial use protectable under the law. 
 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XV – Spring 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2015.166 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154
the Senate debate, legislators indicated a preference for an expansive interpretation 
of the term with an eye on furthering the underlying policy goals of promoting 
investment in the American economy and local job creation.142 For instance, when 
questioned on the scope of “commercial use,” Senator Patrick Leahy, co-sponsor of 
the bill, asserted that diligent preparation for the implementation of an invention, 
such as building prototypes, should satisfy the requirement of “commercial use.”143 
Although several legislators favored further expansions of “commercial use” to 
include “substantial preparation,” the agreement with the universities prevented 
such expansion.144 Even though the exact scope of the “commercial use” element 
remains undefined, legislative debates support expansive interpretation of this 
element. 
Furthermore, expansive interpretation of “commercial use” may be important 
for individual inventors who are not able to immediately invest in building facilities 
for commercial exploitation of their inventions. Accordingly, a narrow 
                                                                                                                                      
These assurances are all the more important for U.S. companies in the 
biotechnology field with extraordinarily long lead times for 
commercialization of its products. 
157 CONG. REC. S5427 (Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Blunt). 
142 See supra note 99. 157 CONG. REC. S1360 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement by Rep. Leahy, 
co-sponsor of the Act). 
143 157 CONG. REC. S5427 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statements of Rep. Blunt and Rep. Leahy). 
144  
The present bill requires the defendant to commercially use the invention in 
order to be able to assert the defense. Chairman SMITH has suggested, at 157 
Cong. Rec. E1219 (daily ed. June 28, 2011), that in the future Congress 
should expand the defense so that it also applies when a company has made 
substantial preparations to commercially use an invention. Some have also 
suggested that the defense should be expanded to cover not just using, but 
also making and selling an invention if substantial preparations have been 
made to manufacture the invention. This would expand the defense to more 
fully compensate for the repeal of current section 102(g), which allows a 
party to invalidate a patent asserted against it if the party can show that it had 
conceived of the invention earlier and diligently proceeded to commercialize 
it. 
* * * 
In the end, however, a substantial-preparations predicate is not included in 
this bill simply because that was the agreement that was struck between 
universities and industry in the House of Representatives last summer, and 
we are now effectively limited to that agreement. Perhaps this issue can be 
further explored and revisited in a future Congress, though I suspect that 
many members will want a respite from patent issues after this bill is 
completed. 
157 CONG. REC. S5430 (Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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interpretation of “commercial use” that excludes such post-inventive activities as 
perfecting the invention and using its specifications for commercial negotiations is 
likely to put an individual inventor at a significant disadvantage compared to a 
large corporation or university. Since individual inventors and their small startup 
companies are often on the forefront of innovation and job creation, putting them at 
a disadvantage would be against the underlying policy objectives of the AIA—
promotion of economic growth and protection of the individual inventor.145 
Therefore, expansive interpretation of “commercial use,” whether it comes about 
judicially or by statute, that would include post-inventive activities of individual 
inventors would level the playing field and better serve the underlying objectives of 
the AIA. 
3. One-Year Requirement 
To be eligible for the defense, the prior inventor must establish commercial 
use of the invention in the U.S. for at least one year before the earlier of (1) the 
effective filing date146 of the second inventor’s application for a patent on the 
invention or (2) the date of the second inventor’s disclosure of the invention to the 
public.147 This requirement creates a significant obstacle to claiming the defense 
because one year is a very long lead time, especially in innovative industries. 
Furthermore, the one-year limitation is likely to have a disparate effect on 
individual inventors who may be unable to start commercial use promptly. 
In an early version of the AIA, the stringent one-year requirement served two 
key legislative objectives: to assure universities of the limited scope of the 
defense148 and to prevent derivation, i.e., use of the defense by someone who 
derived an invention from the true inventor and was able to commercialize it before 
the inventor applied for a patent.149 However, a commentator observed that the 
requirement could result in unfairness to a true first inventor.150 More importantly, 
neither objective justifies the one-year requirement anymore: in the final version of 
                                                          
145 “[T]he America Invents Act will transition our patent filing system from a first-to-invent 
system to the more objective first-inventor-to-file system, used throughout the rest of the world, while 
retaining the important grace period that will protect universities and small inventors, in particular.” 157 
CONG. REC. S5322, S5326 (Sept. 6, 2011) (remarks by Rep. Leahy). 
146 35 U.S.C. § 102(d) (defining effective filing date). 
147 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2) (2012). 
148 See 157 CONG. REC. S5430 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see AIA 
Legislative History II, supra note 63, at 566–67 (highlighting the history of the one-year limit 
provision). 
149 AIA Legislative History II, supra note 67, at 566–67. 
150 Id. 
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the AIA, universities are completely exempt from the prior use defense151 and 
derivation is a bar to the defense.152 Accordingly, this Article advocates abolition of 
the one-year requirement because it does not serve the original legislative purposes. 
Eliminating the one-year requirement would necessitate legislative action. 
However, the courts can mitigate the impact of the artificially high burden by 
expanding the interpretation of what constitutes preparation and how early the 
preparation clock starts ticking. In other words, the scope of “commercial use” and 
the one-year requirement are interrelated issues because an expansive interpretation 
of what constitutes “commercial use” may mitigate the burden of the one-year 
requirement—if an earlier post-inventive activity counts toward meeting the one-
year requirement, then it will be easier to satisfy. 
Finally, as a procedural matter, a prior user must show elements of the 
defense by “clear and convincing evidence,”153 which is another high evidentiary 
standard to satisfy. This requirement, along with the stringent sanctions for 
unreasonable invocation of the defense under § 273(f), are designed to prevent 
abuse of prior use claims. 
B. Limitations on the Defense 
1. Personal Nature of the Defense 
The personal nature of the defense refers to the prohibition of transferability 
of the defense from an eligible prior user to another person or entity, except by 
disposition of a line of business.154 This limitation is common among the 
international analogues of the prior user defense and is often described as a 
personal “statutory license.”155 Notably, although the prior user is not allowed to 
derive the invention “from the patentee, or persons in privity with the patentee,”156 
the prior user does not have to be the original inventor. 
2. Limitations on Expansion and Modification of Use 
The issue of the scope of the defense, specifically, to what extent the prior 
user can expand or modify the use of the patented invention without overstepping 
                                                          
151 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2012). 
152 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(2) (2012). 
153 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2012). 
154 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
155 The term was coined by Judge Aldous in Helitune Ltd. v. Stewart Hughes Ltd., [1991] F.S.R. 
171, 206 (Eng.). 
156 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(2) (2012). 
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the limits of the defense, is a very important but complicated matter, as the 
examples from the U.K. and Japan indicate. The AIA provides significant clarity 
on this important point by allowing “improvements in the claimed subject matter 
that do not infringe additional specifically claimed subject matter of the patent.”157 
Furthermore, although Congress did not impose limits on expansion of the scale of 
the invention’s commercial use by a prior user, it limited the sites at which the 
purchaser of the business may practice the invention to those in use before the 
effective filing date of the patent that claims the invention.158 Finally, the statute 
requires continuous commercial use of the invention; should a prior user stop using 
the invention, the use before such abandonment cannot be used to establish 
applicability of the prior user defense.159 
3. University Exception  
As a result of lobbying by institutions of higher learning, patents to their 
inventions are exempt from the prior user defense:  
A person commercially using subject matter to which 
subsection (a) applies may not assert a defense under 
this section if the claimed invention with respect to 
which the defense is asserted was, at the time the 
invention was made, owned or subject to an obligation 
of assignment to . . . an institution of higher 
education.160  
There is an exception to that exception; namely, this provision does not apply 
“if any of the activities required to reduce to practice the subject matter of the 
claimed invention could not have been undertaken using funds provided by the 
Federal Government.”161 These carve outs have no parallels in foreign patent 
systems. 
                                                          
157 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(3) (2012). 
158 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(1)(B) (2012). 
159 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(4) (2012). 
160 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2012). 
161 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(B) (2012). 
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The university exception covers not only universities but also technology 
transfer organizations.162 Some of those organizations hold and manage inventions 
made by universities, but others are so-called “patent trolls.” While the role of such 
organizations varies from research and innovation to generating additional revenue 
through patent litigation, the university exception applies to all of them. Finally, the 
university exception applies to an invention which “at the time the invention was 
made, [is] owned or subject to an obligation of assignment”163 by an accredited 
institution of higher learning Specifically, the exemption covers privately-funded 
projects, if the collaborative agreement provides for assignment of patents to an 
institution of higher learning. 
In effect, the university exception created a two-tiered patent system, in which 
non-university patents are subject to the claims of a prior user defense by an 
accused infringer, and, arguably, more valuable university patents do not allow for 
such a defense. The latter class is more valuable because of the greater certainty 
over the right to exclude an infringer; an unknown prior user would not be able to 
claim the prior user defense and could be enjoined from practicing the invention. 
To return to the analogy with real property, university-owned patents are 
guaranteed to be free from a prior user’s claim to an easement. 
V. IMPACT OF THE PRIOR USER DEFENSE 
A. Global Corporations: More Secrecy 
As a result of the adoption of the AIA version of the prior user defense, global 
corporations, many of which lobbied in favor of the defense, will enjoy more viable 
choices in protecting their IP assets in the U.S. The availability of the new defense 
is likely to make trade secret protection even more attractive.164 However, the shift 
should be subtle and its magnitude will depend on the corporate perception of 
                                                          
162 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2012); see also 157 CONG. REC. S5430 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(stating that “the university exception was extended to also include university technology-transfer 
organizations.”). 
163 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2012). 
164  
Time will tell if a court will find whether prior user rights encourage so much 
secrecy as to create a constitutional conflict between federal patent law and 
state trade secret law. Adoption of prior user rights in the AIA, however, 
does suggest that Congress believes that trade secrets continue to play a 
robust role in our intellectual property system. Congress . . . has taken a 
cautious step toward embracing trade secrecy.  
Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of 
Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261, 335–36 (2012). 
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several relative risk factors involved in choosing trade secret over patent 
protection.165 Given the lack of guidance from the statute or precedent, combined 
with the heavy burden to show one year of prior commercial use, the prior user 
defense is not likely to be the key factor in the ex ante decision,166 but it is an 
option in ex post infringement defense. The magnitude of the defense’s impact on 
that decision will vary by industry. Industries with innovations that can be 
protected through trade secrets, such as pharmaceutical companies, are likely to 
benefit more than, for instance, software companies. 
B. Universities: A Special Deal 
The new statute grants special treatment to patents that are the result of some 
involvement of an accredited U.S. institution of higher learning.167 Thus, a prior 
user will have no protection against an infringement claim if the infringed patent is 
“made, owned, or subject to an obligation of assignment”168 to the university, even 
if the invention is a result of a joint research effort of a major corporation and a 
university. As a result, it is likely that institutions of higher learning may enjoy not 
only “first grade” patents, which are not subject to the defense, but also the inflow 
of corporate investment to produce such patents in the future. 
C. Individual Inventor: The Worst of Both Worlds 
The impact of the prior user defense on a small inventor is most likely 
negative. Not only are the inventor’s patents subject to the prior user defense if 
infringed upon by a third party, but if the small inventor is accused of infringement, 
the prior user defense may be especially difficult to claim. Unless “commercial 
use” is given a very expansive interpretation, a small inventor would likely not 
qualify because such an inventor usually does not have a commercial enterprise. 
Unlike a large semiconductor company that invests in a plant for a new chip and 
creates thousands of jobs, an individual inventor may not be able to create any jobs 
or make any commercial use of a significant scale quickly enough. Although the 
sponsors of the AIA purported to protect the interests of both small inventors and 
                                                          
165 Granting prior user rights (as the new America Invents Act does) or eliminating injunctions 
would reduce somewhat the incentive given to the winner [of patent race], but it would also reward 
those who were a close second in the race. That would reduce the “stick” incentive to race, since the 
loser would not have as much to lose. The effects on the carrot side would be more complex, since they 
will depend on whether the individual racers think they are likely to win and on whether they are risk-
averse or risk-preferring (that is, whether they would prefer a chance at a large payoff to a certainty of a 
small payoff). Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 757 (2012). 
166 Neu, supra note 8, at 17 (suggesting that in most cases, prior user defense will not be a key 
factor in ex ante planning and outlining possible exceptions to this rule). 
167 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5) (2012). 
168 35 U.S.C. § 273(e)(5)(A) (2012). 
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universities,169 there was a special deal for the latter, but not for the former. Since a 
small inventor is not likely to be able to claim the defense, he or she would do best 
to file a patent application and disclose the invention as early as possible, even 
though he or she may not be able to afford patent prosecution expenses, while the 
large corporations and universities can merely wait and see.170 
Small inventors have made some of the most important discoveries and, 
therefore, their inventive activities should be protected as much as those of larger 
corporations. Thus, in light of the legislative statement that the AIA is designed to 
benefit all inventors, including individual inventors,171 “commercial use” should be 
given an expansive interpretation. A well-developed jurisprudence of the post-
conception “diligence” under the pre-AIA § 102(g) can provide initial guidance 
here.172 Ideally, the legislature should adopt a very broad prior user defense in order 
to level the playing field for all inventive entities. However, since Congress is not 
likely to revisit patent regime soon, a broad interpretation of “commercial use” by 
the courts can achieve similar results. 
CONCLUSION 
A practitioner should be aware of the novel AIA prior user defense and its 
intricacies both in the transactional and litigation contexts. On the transactional 
side, special attention should be paid to the ownership of a patent (university or 
not) and the possibility that a major industry player might claim the defense in an 
infringement case. From the litigation perspective, the uncertainties of the statutory 
language and the arguments for a particular interpretation are matters to be aware 
of. 
While the future impact of the prior user defense is unknown, in its current 
form, ridden with exceptions, it is likely to protect the interests of large 
corporations and universities and damage the interests of the individual inventor. 
Based on the analysis of the legislative intent behind the AIA, including the desire 
to stimulate economic activity and protect the small inventor, an expansive 
interpretation of eligibility for the prior user defense is necessary. Accordingly, the 
                                                          
169 157 CONG. REC. S5321 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[AIA] will provide 
important benefits to U.S. inventors of all sizes.”). 
170 See Jay M. Mattappally, Goliath Beats David: Undoing the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act’s Harmful Effects on Small Businesses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 981, 1020 (2012) (arguing that prior user 
defense is likely to disproportionately benefit large corporations). 
171 157 CONG. REC. S5321 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
172 See USPTO REPORT, supra note 30, at 50 (noting that fairness to the first inventor is the 
underlying policy for both prior user rights and the pre-AIA § 102(g)). 
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legislature should drop the one-year requirement from the text of the provision, and 
either the courts or the legislature should adopt an expansive interpretation of the 
term “commercial use” to include the post-inventive activities of small inventors 
and large businesses alike. 
